Tuesday, January 26, 2021

CPI – Substitution is OK, But Price influence on Transitions Need to be Respected

 The CPI captures a measure of inflation for earners in the urban economy of the US, the so-called CPI-U that is reported in most media outlets as the main indicator of inflation.  A number of changes have been made to the index over the years, in particular, in the 1980s and 1990s, which have caused controversy.  In particular, charges are often made that the newer CPI formulas underreport real inflation felt by consumers.

 

The BLS explains and tries to justify these changes in a publication put out specifically to address public concerns with the ability of the CPI to measure cost-of-living changes in general and accurately reflect increases in particular [1].  The price index formula used in all of the basic CPIs prior to 1999 is called the Laspeyres formula.  The problem with this, BLS claims, is it “tends to overstate changes in the cost of living; specifically, the change in a Laspeyres index is an “upper bound” on the change in the cost of maintaining a standard of living.”  The Laspeyres formula requires the continuing use of the same market basket of items tracked in spite of likely consumer changes in purchases. The “upper bound” condition assumes that prices are constantly inflating and that maintaining the basket mix requires the consumer to pay the full price of increases for each item rather than switch items.  But, what this paper neglects to mention is that the inverse is also true, that the Laspeyres formula is a lower bound on the change in the cost of maintaining a standard of living as well when a deflationary environment persists and prices continue to fall.  In this latter case, consumers are likely to substitute more expensive items for items that were previously purchased, and these changes are missed by the formula as well.

 

Laspeyres was replaced by a geometric mean formula, which makes some account of the changes in purchases due to the increase in price (and decrease in price) of items in the market basket.  This change is the chief point of contention as the BLS states “Among all the criticisms leveled at the CPI, its use of the geometric mean formula to reflect consumer substitution behavior is undoubtedly the most frequently misunderstood and mischaracterized.”  The BLS justification for switching to the geometric mean is based on others using this method, rather than first principle arguments of why it is the correct method to use for CPI purposes. Sort of a, well everyone else is doing it so we should too, kind of argument.  They say “the geometric mean is widely used by statistical agencies around the world. One of two formulas recommended by the International Monetary Fund9 and approved by the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) for use in those countries’ Harmonized Indexes of Consumer Prices (HICP), the geometric mean is used by 20 of 30 countries as a primary formula for computing the elementary indexes in their HICP’s”, which doesn’t explain why they prefer this method, only that they use it.

 

The BLS paper gives an example that is designed to explain and convince the reader that the switch to geometric mean formula was the correct decision. The example reads “Suppose that a person buys four candy bars each week: two chocolate bars and two peanut bars. The bars cost $1 each, so her total spending per week on candy bars is $4. Now suppose that, for some reason, the price of chocolate bars quadruples to $4, while peanut bars re-main at $1. The goal of the CPI is to measure how much the consumer needs to spend each week to consider her-self just as well off as she was before the price increase. A Laspeyres price index calculates the cost of the original purchase quantities: two candy bars of each type. There-fore, the answer according to the Laspeyres formula is that the consumer would need $10 to be as well off as before.”

 

The paper then goes on to describe the reasoning why the geometric mean is better and why the derived result is better.  They say “The Laspeyres answer is correct, however, only if the consumer is completely unconcerned with changes in price and always chooses to purchase chocolate and pea-nut bars in equal numbers, regardless of which is cheaper. The Laspeyres answer is called an upper bound because the right answer cannot be greater than $10; the consumer certainly will be at least as well off as she was before if she can continue to purchase two bars of each type. At the other extreme, the right answer cannot be lower than $4. In the unlikely case that the consumer is entirely indifferent between types of candy bar, she could respond to the increase in the price of chocolate bars by buying four peanut bars instead of two of each type, and she would be no worse off than she was before, even if she still had only $4 to spend. Of course, neither the Laspeyres upper-bound answer of $10 nor the lower-bound answer of $4 is realistic. In the real world, people make tradeoffs on the basis of both price and their preferences, and the actual answer lies in between the two bounds. With $7, for example, our consumer could afford to buy seven peanut bars, one for every day of the week. Thus, $7 might be sufficient to make her as satisfied at the new prices of candy as she was with $4 at the old prices. Put another way, we can be confident that, for some consumers, the Laspeyres result of $10 would overstate the amount they need to maintain their original level of candy satisfaction. The geometric mean formula adopted by the BLS for use in most CPIs gives a somewhat lower answer than the Laspeyres formula, because it puts less weight on the prices that have increased the most (in this case, the price of chocolate bars) and more weight on the prices that have increased less. As it turns out, the geometric mean would say that $8 is the amount needed to keep the average consumer at the original satisfaction level. With $8, the consumer could purchase one chocolate bar and four peanut bars, offset-ting the reduced number of chocolate bars by an increase in the total number of candy bars.”

 

If the example is read carefully and the thinking process of the consumer is followed closely then one will realize that this is actually an argument against the geometric mean formula.  Consider, the consumer wants two chocolate and two peanut bars.  This combination is what makes the consumer happy.  Then the chocolate bar price rises from $1 to $4 a bar.  The explanation says that the consumer will switch to spending $8 to get the same satisfaction as before.  How this is justified is not explained, but it doesn’t make much sense, as the consumer has to go with less of something or a proportion between the bars that were not the same, so something is lost. Furthermore, the consumer has to actually feel that increase in prices to induce a behavior to make the switch in consumption.  That is, the actual price increase felt by the consumer is from $4 to $10 for the desired combination of bars.  The consumer may then make a change to his/her purchasing combination but only after feeling the effect of the price inflation.  A proper measure of inflation needs to contain this full measure of the price increase, as it is precisely this increase in price that prompted the change in behavior.

 

Let’s take this a bit further, as the BLS appears to have a crystal ball that tells them how people will change not just their purchase activities as a result of a price change, but how people’s satisfaction as a result of this change will be.  BLS does recognize that our particular consumer may really likes two chocolate and two peanut bars and may be fairly affluent so that the price increase won’t trouble him/her much.  In this case, the consumer will continue to buy two chocolate and two peanut bars end endure the full price increase.  But, they discount the effect of the price increase on those of lesser mean.  Those for which the price increase actually matters!

 

The change is actually worse than it is made out to be as the BLS may actually have created some kind of shopping budget estimator base on some means of estimating changes in purchases due to changes in price, rather than changes in prices themselves.  This is not a measure of inflation; rather it is a measure of the ability of consumers to consume.  For example, let’s say a mom goes grocery shopping for her family every week and has $100 dollars in her grocery budget.  She buys $90 of various groceries and $10 for prime rib steak, so the total is $100.  The next week the price of the various groceries stays the same, but the prime rib went up to $15, so the mom instead buys flank steak, which is only $10, resulting in the same $100 total.  In a sense, the geometric mean formula measures the budget of how much consumers have to spend and how they allocate that budget, rather than the inflation in prices that go into the consumption decisions.

 

This is not to say that changes in consumption don’t happen, they do, but for the purposes of calculating inflation, these changes need to account for the price changes that drove the change.  Indeed, the basket composition should actually be a bit sticky in that after a change is made from one item to another, some measure of the price of the original item should still be included in the price index for some months or years hence.  For example, for the infamous case of switching from steak to hamburger, once the switch is made where the basket only contains hamburger, some measure of the price of the steak should still be included and followed for some time, as that consumer probably still desires the steak and checks the price to see if this time the steak can be on the menu for dinner tonight.  After some years, the consumer may give up ever hoping for the steak as it appears permanently out of reach, so only then could the price of steak be dropped from this hypothetical index.

 

 

[1] https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2008/08/art1full.pdf

 

Saturday, July 20, 2019

The Fallacy of Krugman’s Baby Sitter Money Economy


Back in 1998 Paul Krugman wrote an interesting article [1] recounting the story of a baby sitting collective on Capitol Hill to draw lessons about how a money system works and what problems can befall a mismanaged system.  The article describes an arrangement where a group of parents, mainly lawyers and economists, created a babysitting group, and to facilitate its operation they also created a fixed amount of script that parents would use to pay for baby sitting time. Krugman goes on to describe how at first the couples hoarded script, so they would have some on hand just in case they needed it, so little actual baby sitting was taking place.  Then, recognizing the problem, the group tried to regulate the use of script by requiring a minimal amount of going out per month, but that didn’t work.  Then they expanded the amount of script by releasing another lot of script into circulation, and the result was a kind of inflation where some parents were going out too much and paying the script far more than they were to provide sitting services.  Neither situation was optimal, so the lesson that we are supposed to take from this story is that fiat money needs to be carefully managed by a disinterested authority.  Krugman was, of course, making a comparison to a real national money system, and the central bank that manages it, and how the wisdom and independence of the central bank coupled with a flexible money supply was necessary for a functioning money system. Another view is that this example is a perfect exposition on why a fiat money system is so unworkable.  It also prompts some thoughts about what is money, and how should it work?

At first glance the whole idea of issuing script, which Krugman calls a “fairly natural solution”, is kind of bizarre to ordinary folks.  It’s the kind of solution that overly educated people might try (this author not included).  The obvious thing that regular people would do is issue IOUs.  E.g. Betty sits for Kathy for one hour, so Kathy issues Betty an IOU that says Kathy owes one hour of babysitting and signs it.  Each IOU lists the person who owes and is signed to show authenticity.  Betty holds on to this IOU for when she needs a sitter.  Betty then sits for Ann for an hour and gets an IOU with Ann’s name on it.  Similarly, other parents do the same.  Kamal sits for Jane and gets an IOU from Jane with her name on it.

Later, Betty needed a sitter and called Ann, who sat for an hour.  Betty gave the IOU with Ann’s name on it to Ann in payment, which Ann then ripped up as the IOU was satisfied.
Then something a bit different happens.  Betty needs a sitter and neither Ann or Kathy are available, so she calls Jane who agrees to sit.  Betty, instead of issuing her own IOU, gives Jane one of the IOUs that she collected previously.  In this case, the one from Kathy.  So now Kathy owes Jane an hour of sitting rather than to Betty.  In effect, Betty has used the IOU as a kind of money. 

This IOU money is specifically tied to the real economy (baby sitter economy).  It was created by performing real work (one hour of sitting).  These IOUs are not conjured into existence like the fiat script of the Capitol Hill group (or our money today) that is disconnected from the real economy.  In the IOU system of money, any amount may be issued by simply performing more real work (hours of sitting).  And any number of IOUs may be redeemed by appointment with the appropriate sitter.  Neither action causes recessions or booms.  Any time you need some IOUs you just need to do some work (sitting for others), and you get paid in the IOUs.

In this system money, the IOUs, are created by new work and destroyed by redeeming for work.  So, the supply fluctuates as needed.  The supply is not controlled by a central authority like the script was controlled by the Capitol Hill group.  So, one never needs to appeal to an outside authority to get IOUs. The amount of IOUs in the system is self regulating.

Now, this situation is not perfect.  Perhaps the value of an hour of babysitting is different for various people?  Maybe sometimes, say around holidays, its hard to find someone willing to babysit?  Maybe some people will babysit at a time of high demand for greater compensation, say sit one hour but get paid IOUs worth two hours?  The two parties just need to agree on the deal.  In this case two IOUs are issued for an hour each.  Regardless of the deal, the IOUs are still each worth one hour of babysitting.  In any case, the situation is self-rectifying and does not lead either shortages or surpluses of IOUs. 

Another problem is that the IOUs are tied to specific individuals.  Those that owe babysitting time.  So, while the IOUs can be exchanged among the members of the economy (the sitter group), the specific person listed on an IOU must be available to perform the owed sitting duty.  But, that is not such a problem in practice as you must call around to find someone willing to sit anyway.

Perhaps this idea of the IOU is the lesson for a money system?  Money that is based on production in the real economy.  Money that represents real economic activity rather than moving around financial instruments.  

Money, in all cases, is essentially an IOU.  Money itself has little value to the holder in that it can’t be eaten, worn, lived in, provide transportation, etc.  So, it’s a holder of value for acquiring those things in the future.  But, unlike script, work or creation of real value, proceeds the creation of the IOU money, whereas script is simply issued and taken for granted that it has value by fiat.

The moral then is: don’t have a fiat currency that is independent of the real economy with a central bank that tightens and eases as it sees fit.  Rather, have a currency that is tied to actual, productive economic activity.

How could this work in practice?  One way is to have the federal government issue currency rather than debt.  The currency would pay for the expenses of the government and flow into the economy.  As Thomas Edison said “If the Nation can issue a dollar bond it can issue a dollar bill. The element that makes the bond good makes the bill good also.” [2]  (For those readers who say, hey that’s just MMT.  That’s almost right.  This is equivalent to MMT with the condition that the Fed buys up all the bonds issued by the government.)  The government would pay for all the services it provides by printing currency and spending it into the economy.  It would also require all taxes to be paid in the some currency. The government could carry out Keynesian stimulus if it pleases by spending more (issuing more money) during a downturn, and spending less (withdrawing money) during a boom.  Banks would simply be loan arrangers that take deposits, pool them, determine credit worthiness and lend the money without a fractional reserve system of money multiplication.  Commercial banks would be separate from other, speculative, institutions to ensure that only sound loans are made into the real economy.  Investment banks would simply pool investors money to make investments.

[2] New York Times, December 4 and 6, 1921

Thursday, June 27, 2019

The Federal Reserve should stop paying interest on reserves

In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 the Federal Reserve took many extraordinary measures to prop up the financial system.  Among these was the decision to pay interest on funds held in reserve at the Fed by member banks as authorized by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.

This policy may have been prudent at the height of the crisis, but now, more than ten years later, the banks have returned to stability and this support is no longer needed.
In the almost one hundred years before the 2008 crisis the Fed has only paid interest on reserves very recently for only two short months, first after the 9/11 attacks and second at the beginning of the crisis in 2007.  Despite two world wars, a Great Depression, periods of strong growth, and other gyrations of the economy and financial system no justification was found for paying such interest during these historic events.

Banks have been clamoring for interest on reserves since the beginning of the Fed.  But, there are no good reasons to pay interest on reserves outside of crisis periods.  Reserves held at the Fed and elsewhere are created by the Fed itself as so called “high-powered” money, and in a sense belongs to the Fed. 

Early in the crisis the interest rate paid on reserves was only 0.25%, but now the rate has risen to 2.35% [1].  In June 2019 the total reserves held at the Fed totaled $1577B [2].  At straight interest that equates to $37B in interest paid for the year.  This is an enormous amount of money that the banks have done nothing to earn.

The interest paid is not just a Fed accounting mechanism.  Rather, these are real funds that would otherwise have been deposited with the US Treasury and been available for Congress to spend.  These funds are paid on a kind of autopilot mode without annual Congressional appropriations authorization. So, they have and will continue to grow without any Congressional appropriation or additional authorization.  

If the banks still need this money, then there is something fundamentally wrong with the banks that needs to be resolved.  But, it the banks have recovered, as is evidenced by their strong profitability, then they no longer have need of these funds and Congress should rescind the payment of interest on reserves.


  

No new currency is needed to pay interest on fiat currency

Often one hears claims that fiat currencies are intrinsically inflationary and ever expanding because more currency is needed in the future to pay the interest on current fiat currency.  At first glance this seems reasonable, but this is actually a specious argument.

A simple example will make this clearer.  Consider a case where an amount of currency has been created through loans, but no more will be created in the future.  Thus the money supply is constant.  Furthermore, let's assume that only the interest on these loans is paid by the borrowers so that the loans themselves will never be paid back, and the money supply will stay constant.

In this case, the interest to pay on the loans must come from the available money supply, which we've already said is fixed in amount.  So, if the claims about needing an ever expanding money supply are correct then this system will quickly grind to a halt as no more currency is being created.  For this to happen the banks would need to hoard all the interest that they receive and never pay it out in any way into the economy.  By doing this the banks would be creating a deflation in the economy as the amount of currency in circulation is ever decreasing as the interest is paid to the banks year after year.  In effect, the banks are increasing their reserves by this hoarding action.

In reality, the banks that receive interest on their loans also pay out those funds in the form of salaries, costs, and profits.  So, the interest payments that come into the bank also go out in the same amount.  This is where the funds for paying the interest comes from.  The interest payments simply circulate in the economy with payments made to the banks as interest and the funds spent back into the economy by the banks.

In a real banking system, as we have in the US, banks are required to hold reserves by regulation at the Federal Reserve.  Moreover, the Fed provides these reserves to the banks. The banks could increase or decrease their reserves as previously mentioned and this would change the money supply in circulation.  But banks have little incentive to increase their reserves as this would reduce the amount they can lend and the resulting interest payments they receive.  Changes in the money supply are closely monitored by the Fed and it acts through its open market operations to influence the money supply by buying or selling assets in the market.  So, there are always funds to pay interest on fiat currency.  The amount of funds may vary according to reserves held by banks and the Fed actions, but nothing is specifically expansionary in the money supply due to interest payments alone.

Thursday, January 3, 2019

Best Description of Banking and Finance Today

Professor Richard Werner gave an interview recently where he very concisely describes how our financial and banking system currently works, and more importantly, why it doesn't work well and is unstable.

See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EC0G7pY4wRE

Of particular interest is his comments on bank lending for speculation and how this leads to bubbles and crashes in markets.  How preventing bank lending to speculators, including investment banks, eliminates these boom bust cycles.

In the US we had a law that implemented this principle called Glass-Steagall.  This Depression era law was part of the New Deal separated commercial banking from investment banking and other FIRE industry sectors so that bank lending was not available to these other sectors.

The professor points out the bank lending creates money.  If that money is created against existing assets such as securities and fine artworks then the only result is to increase the amount of money in the economy without creating any new value.  This only leads to increased prices as more dollars chase the some goods.  The reverse is also true.  As lending is withdrawn the money supply falls and asset prices follow suit.  The boom and the bust.

Wednesday, January 2, 2019

Single Currency Trade Mechanism

Trade has been in the news quite a bit lately due to the Trump administration's focus on the trade deficit, particularly that with China, and its desire to significantly reduce the size of the deficit.

The source of the trade deficit is often presented as one of strong and weak currencies, and an imbalance in demand, with a desire in the US for imports greater than the desire in other countries, again in China in particular, for US goods.  American consumers buy foreign goods with US dollar with the result that US currency builds up in the accounts of the surplus nations.  Up until now these surplus countries have been content to either sit on these large piles of cash, or more likely invest them in US bonds, thus leading to even greater deficits in future as the interest that is also accruing adds to the deficits.  Ultimately, these balances of US dollars must be spent in the US in some form at some time.  How and when appear to be up to the surplus countries, and the US is simply ceding control over trade and currency to those countries, and their intermediaries.

True trade deficits were not possible under the old Bretton Woods system, as surpluses of currencies were re-balanced by the transfer of gold from the deficit country to the surplus country.  In effect the surplus country was buying gold from the deficit country using the surplus currency thereby eliminating the surplus.

Another mechanism is possible for facilitating and settling trade balances that eliminates ongoing trade imbalances.  That of the single currency trade mechanism.  Under this system all trade between two nations is carried out in the currency of one of the nations.  E.g. trade with the US would be performed using only the US dollar.  Sales of an export nation (US imports) would accrue US dollars, and purchases from the US (US exports) would consume those dollars.  Under this mechanism, the US would set up an account for each trade partner nation in the export/import bank of the US.  Exports to the US would generate funds in US dollars which would be deposited in the nation's account.  All exports from the US to that nation would be paid for with US dollars from that account.  A limit on the size of the balance held in the account will limit the trade deficit with that nation.  Once the limit is reached no further sales to the US are allowed.  The trade partner nation will need to spend down the account balance by purchasing US exports in order to regain the right to import to the US.  In this way, the trade imbalance with the US never exceeds the set account limit.

The account limit can also be used to eliminate existing trade balance deficits by setting it to a negative value, which implies that the trade partner nation must itself run a trade deficit with the US to create a negative balance.  This negative limit can be reset periodically, say every month, so that the existing trade balance deficit will be progressively paid down by the surplus nation refunding the account each month from its holdings of existing trade deficit US dollars.  When the accrued trade deficit balance is paid off the set account limit will be set to zero or some relatively small amount that is fixed rather than reset monthly.  Thus, the trade from that point on is essentially in balance.

A great advantage of this system is that it completely eliminate currency exchange rates from trade, as all trade takes place in the single currency.  Indeed, exchange rates may then be set by using the price of a basket of goods traded in both countries as a standard, and comparing the price in US dollars for those goods to the price in the foreign currency.  The resulting ratio is the currency exchange rate.  Any alternative mechanism to set the exchange rate, such as a floating exchange rate or a rate set by the trade partner nation, would require that it result in a demand for imports in the trade partner nation equal to the value of exports from that nation.  Issues of currency manipulation by nations or by intermediaries and speculators are eliminated.  In essence, trade is de-financialized, and returned to the barter model that ultimately underlies trade between nations that use differing currencies. 

Tuesday, May 1, 2018

The Old Deal Strikes Back

The economic situation that we face today in America is not a recent creation, nor one of the twentieth century.  Rather it is an ongoing evolution of events and conditions that started long ago but became dominant at the end of the US Civil War, and then accelerated following the First World War, until they climaxed in the crash of 1929.  This was the time of the "old deal", that dominated in the period of 1875 to 1930.  This period saw a number life changing trends that radically changed life in America including: new technology that dramatically increased productivity, the speed up for the movement of people, goods, and information, a rapidly growing population, and the rise of large corporations.

Expansion of the population and the their sphere of control pushed humans into new frontiers so that new opportunities existed for those seeking them.  In the years from 1875, people pushed west in the US at a rapid rate until in 1900 the Interior Department declared the frontier closed.  Globally, this outward expansion continued until about 1930.  The end result of this was that all land, and the resources contained within them, were now claimed as being owned by some person or group, and if anyone else wanted land or resources he or she would have to negotiate with the owners for it.  Nations began imposing restrictions on trade to manage this new order through tariffs, taxes, and price maintenance programs.  Furthermore, Large corporations, cartels, and combines rather than individuals or families came to control most raw materials from 1875 onward.  Patent rights became a more important form of restriction of ownership as the technology based industrial economy expanded. As a result of these effects wealth became more concentrated, and became known as the "gilded age".  Furthermore, a growing class of un-propertied persons emerged without ties to a family farm or business, who had no assets other than their work skills.  These workers, as we'll see, were vulnerable to any downturn in the economy because they had no family farm or shop to fall back on to sustain them with the basic necessities of life until the economy improved.

The growth of corporations and complex organizations came to dominate the economy during this period.  The complicated methods of production of the growing industries required extensive organization, with a myriad of specialized tasks that needed clock-like coordination to meet the ever increasing demands for more productivity.  A new management class evolved to run these enterprises, while the skilled crafts-person saw a shrinking demand for his skills.  Industrialization was overtaking agriculture as the dominant employment of workers leading people away from their farms and into cities where these new jobs were located.

A complex financial system grew up to fund these extensive and complicated enterprises.  This was the time of "orthodox" economics with the reliance on the gold standard, where a dollar was exchangeable for a dollar's worth of gold.  The rise of central banking and private banker control of money during the lead up to WWI characterized this era, which was achieved though their claims that the government should stay out of business, as only business knows what's best for business and the economy.  But, during WWI the governments of the world borrowed from private banks and inflated money, and afterward the banks continued to speculate in the inflated government and private debt and credit, until the crash of 1929 and the collapse of the banking system that followed.  The result was a nation in Depression and a serious loss of confidence in banks and financial institutions. "If private bankers are ever again to posses and control money and credit, it will have to be on some other authority than the mere assumption of their exclusive wisdom respecting the mysteries of finance." [1]

Concentration of ownership, with the primary business unit being the corporation, grew steadily larger in this period.  A key result of these changes was that "An ever increasing wage and salary class of people emerged and became dependent for a livelihood upon the property ownership of control of a relatively small number of people and the business units through which they operated."[2]  No longer did the family farm and the small craftsman and merchant dominate the economy.  Rather, the corporate, industrial and service economy that continues to this day was the new norm.  This was a dramatic change that took people off their family land and into cities where they owned less property and worked for wages to make their living.  In 1870, 54% of people worked in agriculture, while 22% were in industry, and 24% in services.  By 1930, only 23% were in agriculture, 29% in industry, and 48% in services.[3]  Services had come to dominate the economy, but many of these were not considered necessities for existence that would be important during the coming Depression, such as education, recreation, and medical care, and workers in these fields suffered especially in the Depression as a result.

The growth of large corporations was a key aspect of the overall growth of the corporate business organization in the US.  Not only did corporations come to dominate the organization of enterprise overall, but a few, very large corporations emerged that controlled vast, key areas of the economy.  By 1933,  the 200 largest corporations controlled 20% of the economy. and 60% of the physical assets.[4]  These large companies had great control over their industry segments, with the critical ability to set prices without any meaningful competition.  Thus, these large corporations could tune their production to whatever level was needed to maintain profits, even if this meant laying of large segments of their workforce and idling their plants.  This ability to set both prices and production was a key enabler of the Great Depression, as is evidenced by the fact that during the Depression, from 1930 to 1932, the 960 largest corporations had a profit of $4.6B, while the combination of all other corporations had a loss of $12B.[5]  During almost the same period from 1929 to 1932, agriculture, which lacked the pricing power and ability to reduce production that large industrial corporations had, saw their income drop from $12B to $5.3B, while production stayed almost unchanged.[6]  Thus, small corporations, small businesses, and the farmer took an enormous financial hit during the Depression while large corporations remained largely profitable.

The war that ended in 1918 had brought tremendous change to the American industrial base.  Mass production was invented and expanded before the war, but it was during the war that the methods of mass production were applied in a wide variety of industries and came to dominate the American manufacturing processes.  At war's end, these new, efficient methods were not forgotten, rather they were incorporated into the production of consumer goods to usher in the era of "mass production" and "mass consumption" that characterized the modern era.

At the same time, farmers across American were starting to feel the effects of canceled food contracts for the war and the plunging prices of the resulting oversupply.  Many farmers were unable to meet the costs of servicing the loans they had taken out to provide for the expected war need, and now were paying the price.  In the coming years many would lose their farms, and those who kept them were not able to make any money due to low food prices that would last for decades.  The Great Depression had started for American farmers long before it hit Wall St and main street.

The 1920's roared for those on Wall St and in the business community.  Easy credit and speculation led to booming markets and great increases in wealth for those few who were able to participate.

This was still the time of the "old deal" where government played a small part in the economy.  Businesses made most of the decisions about economic and business activities that were undertaken, with little government regulation.  "Orthodox" economics ruled.  The idea that government should take any significant role in the economy was considered heretical. 

But it all came to an end with the crash of 1929, and the Great Depression officially began shortly thereafter.  The negative effects on the economy were quick and severe.  Within a few years real unemployment in America soared above 25%.  Bread lines and men roaming the country looking for work became a common sight.

Businesses could not expand production because of a lack of demand, and instead cut production to maintain profits, which resulted in more unemployed and a further reduction in demand.  This vicious cycle continued into the new administration of Franklin Roosevelt and the beginning of his New Deal policies to thwart the decline and restore the economy to health.

The New Deal was a radical change for the role of the Federal Government in dealing with the economy and finance, and the role government played in the lives of every citizen.  For the first time outside of war, the government played a significant role in the economy.  It hired people directly through its myriad of "alphabet" programs designed to put people back to work immediately and help businesses recover.  It supported and regulated business practices to grow output and reduce unemployment.  It regulated the financial system to prevent the kind of excessive speculation and risk taking that enabled the crash and Depression.  And it provided a system of support, or security, to the population in general to help protect people from events that were outside their control.

Only a few years earlier the programs of the New Deal would have been unthinkable.  But, years of the standard economic "old deal" wisdom: that the economy regulates itself, that business will eventually pick up on its own, and the economy will come back to full strength in the natural course of things, did not have the desired effect of improving the economy, rather the economy kept getting worse year after year.  So, by the time the Roosevelt administration took office the economy was in dire straights, and both businessmen and the general population were willing to let the federal government intervene in the economy in a big way to try to get some kind of improvement going.

By the time the New Deal was fully in place, the economic and financial makeup of the US had been completely transformed.  The federal government was now a major employer both in the direct government business and the multitude of relief programs.  The financial markets were regulated, with the key legislation being the Glass-Steagall act which separated commercial banking from investment banking, brokerage, and insurance.   Labor was strengthened through the National Labor Relations Board, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and empowerment of independent trade unions, which for the first time, gave workers real economic clout to improve their standard of living.  Economic security for workers through unemployment insurance and old-age and disability insurance (Social Security) was implemented.  Extensive spending on infrastructure projects like the TVA and Grand Coulee dam became standard practice.  Some programs were temporary to provide immediate relief and prime the economic pump, including programs such as the CCC and the WPA which would be phased out before WWII.  The income tax, capital gains, and other taxes were used to change the use and distribution of income to favor those who spend and disfavor those who horde.

The depth and length of the Great Depression were a result of the fundamental changes that had happened in the American economy from the end of the Civil War to the start of the Depression.  American had modernized and industrialized with most American working for wages at businesses, and at service occupations in particular, instead of farming the family farm.  Thus, American workers were highly exposed to any downturn in the economy as never before.  When people lived on farms, and a recession hit, they could count on having a roof over their head and food to eat from their own farm, which would allow them to tough it out until the economy recovered.  By 1930, with many workers relying on wages as their only form of income, a recession of any significant magnitude or duration had devastating effects on worker's livelihoods.  Workers lost their homes or were evicted from rentals.  They couldn't feed themselves or their families.  And they also stopped buying other goods and services because they had no money.  This resulted in a further shrinking of demand and further layoff in a vicious cycle the rapidly saw the expansion of the unemployed with no jobs to fill.

The years of depression brought about a new understanding of the modern economy and the place of government, finance, industry, and farms within it.  The fundamental lesson learned was that, given the changes in the economy and the desperation that then ensued during the Great Depression, the federal government must play an active role in the economy to keep it running at its full capacity and moderate the effects of any downturns.  It was also learned that private industry would not risk its profit, or even potential losses, by hiring and spending on capital if no clear demand for goods and services existed, and would layoff workers and close factories if needed to maintain those profits.  Only the federal government had the ability and the authority to make the dramatic incursions into the economy that were required to once again bring it to full capacity.

During the New Deal, the Roosevelt administration experimented with numerous programs to stimulate demand, and hence production and its subsequent hiring, in the economy.  The government even tried something so commonplace today that we hardly think anything novel of it... deficit spending.  But the amounts spent, while sizable, were not sufficient to produce a lasting change on the spending and production levels of industry.  Industry had so much slack capacity, and such a great ability to increase productivity within its existing capacity, that once these stimulus programs had ended, production and employment shrank back to pre-stimulus levels.  What was needed was a huge stimulus that would alter the foundation of production and consumption to a stable, higher level.

The stimulus that brought about this fundamental, foundational change in the economy by the means of government spending was WWII.  The war effort was enormous by any measure and the economy grew and shifted as the country moved the economy to a war footing.  Deficit spending through borrowing was equally enormous, but in the case with war, few objectors could be found to defend fiscal prudence, as was the common objection that impeded similar spending on civilian programs during the Depression.

At war's end the fear of government and business leaders was what would happen to the economy once the war spending subsided and the "boys came home"?  Would the economy slip back into a recession?  These fears turned out to be unfounded as the resulting post-war economy turned out far differently than that predicted by many. Those returning soldiers produced a significant boost to the civilian economy thanks to savings during the war and government programs for vets like education and loan assistance once the war was over when they transitioned back to civilian life.  The home front population had also been saving during the war years, as not much was available to buy anyway due to the shift to war goods production while the federal government was doing most of the buying for the war effort.  All this pent up civilian demand was unleashed at the end of the war, with people eager to buy new homes, cars, clothes, and furnishings that they had gone so long without, and most importantly they had the savings and credit to buy them.  The resulting demand drove production, which of course led to a major hiring boom.

After the war, the international financial system was reorganized by putting into place the Bretton Woods system of currency exchange and settlement.  Under this system all currencies were pegged to the only remaining strong currency, the US dollar.  Critically, for the success of this system, the US dollar was itself pegged to gold, so that the effect was that all currencies were transitively pegged to gold, and gold was used to settle international trade among nations.  The critical nature of gold to this system was that all currencies were tied to a real, physical commodity that had generally recognized value everywhere in the world, and could not be conjured out of thin air.  No country could inflate its currency without suffering a decline in gold reserves to settle the trade deficits that typically resulted from extra currency being available for purchases.  All trade then was equivalent to the offset of values of goods from one nation going out, and from the counterpart nation coming in, plus the settlement of any deficit by transfer of gold.  Thus, goods were effectively bought with gold if no export good could be exchanged in kind.  The result was the happy situation where currencies were closely tied to the real economy of goods and services, and served to facilitate business in the economy, rather than exist as entities unto themselves.

Another key piece of legislation that proved critical to providing stability and soundness to the financial system were the Glass-Steagall rules that separated commercial banking from investment banking, insurance, and real estate.  Commercial banks have the unique and awesome power of creating the nation's money supply through the means of fractional reserve lending.  In fractional reserve banking, loans are produced at an amount of approximately ten times the amount of the reserves, thus expanding the money supply by that same amount.  This ability to create money is a powerful, and potentially disastrous one if mismanaged, that needs to be carefully regulated to prevent any instability in the money system and unethical actions from occurring. Commercial banks were bastions of propriety during the post war period, and only lent against sound collateral like land, buildings, and machinery. Furthermore, the government insurance of deposits through the FDIC and related programs, encouraged people to keep their money in the bank, thus providing for the expanded action of money creating loans.  Investment banks did not have access to the government backed credit and loan created money of the commercial banks under these rules, so they had to actually get investors to risk their own money to make investments, which is what investment banks are for after all.  The result was that the financial system was predominantly sound, and bank failures almost nonexistent during the reign of Glass-Steagall.  The exception was the Savings and Loan crisis period of the 1980s when the Federal Reserve raised the discount rate to stem the rise of inflation, effectively making the S&Ls no longer going concerns, as the interest they had to pay exceeded the interest they could bring in as profits.  We will see that the inflation the Fed was fighting was caused by the undoing of the Bretton-Woods agreement.

The systems of the New Deal now firmly in place, the economy grew at a robust rate for the years from the end of WWII until the early 1970's.  It was a time of immense affluence for a majority of Americans who years earlier could only dream of such comfort and opportunity.  These were the "good old days" that people remember today where the middle class expanded dramatically and poverty dropped year after year.  Where well-paying jobs were available for those who sought them.

A less welcome activity also expanded during these boom years...balance of payments deficits.  At war's end the US was the only major economy left unscarred by the war.  The Axis countries lay in ruin, and only after many years, and with aid from the US, were they able to get their economies back up to a high capacity.  Part of the recovery effort for the Axis, as well as other Allied countries, was to boost trade to quickly regrow their industrial base.  The US was the trade partner for these countries as it had a booming economy with consumers that had large and growing incomes to purchase those trade goods and a large manufacturing base to supply needed goods to the war ravaged economies.  The US ran trade surpluses during these years, but nonetheless ran significant balance of payment deficits due to payments overseas for aid and capital outflows.  The result was that the US balance of payments deficit grew rapidly year after year after the war, but the problem was not immediately acknowledged, as all deficits were settled by covering the deficits with transfers of gold.  In this way the deficits were paid for by exchanging the commodity of gold for the excess expenditures.  For example, in 1960 the government exported $1.689B of gold to cover the balance of payments deficit. [8]

By the early 1970s the US started to run trade deficits as well as other payments, and the balance of payments deficits had become a serious problem for the US, as it was exporting a significant amount of its gold stock each year to cover the deficits and this stock was running low, or at least lower than the US wanted it to be. [9]

The response of the US government to the growing trade deficits and increasing outflow of gold, was... not to deal with it.  Denial is a common government reaction to problems, particularly with ones that are extremely difficult or unpleasant to resolve.  All trade deficits eventually come into balance, as countries want tangible goods or services in exchange for its goods and services, rather than to hold another country's currency.  The only thing that surplus export countries can do with the accumulated foreign currency is spend it in the country from where it came, which in the process of doing, should eliminate the deficits and bring trade back into balance.  But, the deficits were being balanced by the transfer of gold, so this accumulation of currency in surplus countries never happened.  Instead the surplus countries accumulated gold reserves, which they may not really have wanted, but accepted as a form of real value payment anyway as specified under Bretton-Woods.

When the US government finally did respond to what was becoming a crisis, it made a crucial and fundamental mistake. Instead of acknowledging the trade deficit as the problem issue, and taking corrective actions such as imposing the traditional government trade mechanisms of tariffs and quotas, the US government instead decided in August 1971 to remove the US dollar from the Bretton Woods exchange mechanism and let the US dollar float against other currencies.  International currency traders would now be in charge of the value of the US dollar.

The decision to float the dollar had multiple harmful effects.  Some were immediate, and some took place over many years and decades.  Furthermore, the action of withdrawing from the Bretton Woods gold trade settlement system was effectively a default by the US on the exchange of the dollar.  Under Bretton Woods the US would give trade partner countries gold for its dollars, and after it simply didn't.  International demand for dollars dropped and US inflation immediately shot up, with workers feeling the pinch in higher prices but stagnant incomes.  The OPEC oil embargo started shortly thereafter, and many economists and pundits erroneously blamed it for the economic problems.  In reality, the effects of the oil embargo were related only in that the oil exporting countries didn't want to be paid in dollars that were being inflated away.  This marked the high point of American workers participation in the rewards of the growing economy, and since this time wages and incomes of most Americans have been flat, while the economy continues to grow at the brisk pace, if not as fast as during the boom years.

The second harmful and ongoing effect of abandoning Bretton Woods was that the dollar, and other major currencies, were no longer tied to the real economy.  The US dollar became a true fiat currency that could be issued at will.  Or, in the case of the fractional reserve system, borrowed into existence at any opportunity to lend, with any collateral that suited the need, whether actually sound or not.

Lastly, the issue of the trade deficits was swept under the rug.  As stated before, all trade deficits eventually come into balance, either by controlled means like Bretton Woods and government action, or through potentially disruptive means such as a fickle and irrational international market system.  The longer the deficits exist, the more trade debt builds up, and the more likely an uncontrolled and devastating correction will result.  Indeed, the fact that a correction has not happened in the forty plus years since the withdrawal indicates strongly that the market mechanism is inadequate for maintaining a balance of trade over reasonable time periods.

The US government did recognize the threat to the dollar as a result of its conversion to a floating, fiat currency. But, again, instead of dealing with the problem directly to implement a permanent solution, the government once again turned to a trick to keep the demand for the dollar high.  In 1974 the US made a deal with the Saudis to have all purchases of oil priced in dollars.  In exchange, the US would ensure the security of the Saudi regime.  The de-facto effect of this deal was that all oil was priced in dollars and became known as the petro-dollar.   This action had the effect of propping up the dollar as anyone who wanted to buy oil needed to first obtain the necessary amount of dollars to execute the purchase.  The oil producing countries meanwhile started to accrue large amounts of dollars, which they then invested in the US in government bonds and other assets.  The trade deficit and dollar settlement issue were not solved by this trick.  Rather the issues were merely kicked down the road to a future point where the balance of payments and trade debt with the oil producers would become untenable either because they had too accumulated too many dollars to spend or will start to accept other currencies in payment for oil. [18]

The 1980s brought deregulation and "free trade" ideas that dismissed the notion of national industrial and trade policies as being counterproductive.  The effect was that manufactures saw it profitable to export jobs instead of goods, with millions of production jobs and thousands of factories moved overseas.  Any time workers wanted a real raise, their jobs likely went overseas instead, and they were left unemployed.  Incredibly, the US government did nothing to prevent this destruction of the industrial base.  Indeed, the government did all it could to aid and abet this outsourcing of the US economy, as the pundits and economists explained that this is the new economy and all is good, while the notions of the New Deal were quickly becoming a fading memory.  The "old deal" factions were quite pleased with this turn of events as their share of the national income grew faster than it had since before the crash of 1929.  Equally odd, was the lack of a correction of the US dollar exchange rate as all these dollars piled up overseas, the dollar should have dropped in value, making imports more expensive and exports cheaper.  But, somehow this never came to pass, perhaps purely due to the peculiar state of the petrodollar?

The last nail in the coffin for the US economy was the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999.  Investment banks wanted to merge with commercial banks and insurers to create "one stop shopping" for financial products. In particular, in 1998 Citicorp, a commercial bank holding company executed a merger with Travelers insurance company to form Citigroup.  The merger was a clear violation of Glass-Steagall, so the Fed issued Citigroup a temporary wavier to allow the company to continue operations.  They promised to keep investment banking from influencing commercial bank operations, but this was soon shown to be not the case.  Inevitably, the government insured deposits and fractionally reserve created currency found its way to less than sound investments.  Even completely speculative financial elements such as novel derivative securities were used as collateral for loans, something that was seen before the crash of 1929.  The leveraged trade and buyout business boomed as "cheap money" abounded on Wall St. where traders and brokers made millions in this new found unregulated, cash rich environment.  On main st. the story was starkly different as more middle class jobs disappeared overseas and put downward pressure on incomes.

Speculation became the driving force in the economy in the 1990s, but a harbinger of future financial catastrophe occurred in the collapse of LTCM, a hedge fund that was highly leveraged to the point where its default would have harmed the entire financial system.  Only a late night bailout organized by the Federal Reserve warded off catastrophe, but no new regulations resulted from this event.

However, some real progress was being made in the economy at this time in the tech sector, where the telecom boom was happening due to deregulation and the Internet economy was being created, but a bubble of irrational exuberance was building in the tech stocks as well.  Outside of Wall St. and the tech sector, the economy was not doing well at all for people.  The federal government budget was also doing well.  So much so, that Fed chairman Alan Greenspan worried that the US would actually pay down the entirety of the national debt and run a surplus [19]. His suggestion was for a tax cut to prevent this from happening with the reason that it may affect the Fed's ability to conduct monetary policy. President G.W. Bush did just that in a series of "Bush tax cuts" that will add $3T to the national debt by 2019 [20].  Paying down the national debt never happened as events intervend as they usually do to cause a increase in the budget deficit and the run up a massive national debt that only increased during the financial crisis of the Great Recession.

The goal of tax cuts at all cost and rationalizations has become a core principle of the "old deal" faction.  Federal programs for the middle class cost money and if the government can be shown to be running massive deficits then an argument is put forth by that faction that the government can't afford these programs as they add to the deficit.  They even go so far as to claim that the federal government will go bankrupt.  A technically impossible feat as all debts are denominated in US dollars and the government controls the supply of dollars.  The worst case scenario is one of hyperinflation as the government prints money to pay debts as did Germany in the 1920s.

The inevitable collapse of the tech sector market in 2001 led the Federal Reserve to take aggressive action to prop up the markets.  Too aggressive we now see, as they pumped hundreds of billions into the financial system by lowering interest rates well below their previous levels.  The result was to inflate another bubble and boom in the housing industry as home prices soared in response to cheap credit.  People don't buy houses, they by monthly payments, so as interest rates fall the principal portion of the monthly payment goes up and with it the home price.  Add to this the mortgage loan fraud called sub-prime "liar loans", and the stage was set for the next  financial crisis.  During the housing boom people were using their homes as ATMs to extract the growing cash value to maintain the life styles that their jobs would no longer support.  During these years the US government also started to run up ever growing perpetual budget deficits because "deficits don't matter" we had been told.  So, now everyone was in hock to the investing class. This, of course, suited this "old deal" factions quite nicely.

Eventually, the housing bubble did burst in 2007, and with it the economy went into recession.  The "Great Recession" had begun. Home prices plunged.  The inflated securities based on home loans also tanked as the underlying value of homes decreased and the realization sunk in that the securities had been insincerely overrated by the private securities rating agencies when they were created.  The banks holding these securities and related leveraged securities were now technically insolvent, including all of the largest Wall St. banks.  The first to go was Lehmann Brothers, which set off a panic on Wall St. not seen since the Great Depression.  Bear Stearns was next.  It couldn't be saved, but a shotgun buyout by JP Morgan Chase was arrange at only pennies on the dollar of its value it had just weeks earlier.  Soon after the Federal government stepped in to bail out the big banks.  The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was rushed through Congress as the first measure to bail out the big banks by providing $700B to acquire preferred stock and troubled mortgages from the ailing banks.  A multitude of other programs by the Federal government and the Federal reserve followed that put the US government on the hook for potentially tens of trillions of dollars of debt risk and raise the Feds balance sheet to a record $4.5 trillion.

Meanwhile, unemployment surged to the highest level since the Great Depression.  Labor force participation rate dropped from over 66% to less than 63% of the population [21], which equates to about 10 million people losing their jobs.  Fortunately, Depression era unemployment insurance helped to ease this blow.  But many never found new jobs and sunk further into other Federal relief programs.  People who had bought homes near the peak of the bubble found themselves underwater with homes worth less than the mortgages owed, causing many to just walk away from the houses.  Many rationalizations for bailing out the banks were floated including that they would start lending again or restructure loans.  None of this came to pass, leading many to ask "where's my bailout?"

The members of the "old deal" did just fine as their stock holding were propped up by cheap Fed money and their bank holdings were bailed out.  For these people, the Great Recession became a once-in-a-lifetime buying opportunity to snap up depressed assets.

Once again, the federal government did little to nothing to correct the policies that led to the crisis.  Indeed, it appears that the federal government has become incapable of addressing events head on and providing the needed regulatory remedies. Instead, the government provides bailouts to the investor class and platitudes the the majority of citizens who see the future for their children as having less than they had.

The government of the New Deal is no more. Will the government return to the lessons of the New Deal to create once again an economy and society that benefits everyone?  That allows all to share in the prosperity and growth of the economy?  Or will the deficits and debts of all kinds continue to climb until while the benefits of these excesses accumulate to the financial sector and continue to leave Main Street behind?



References:
[1] "The old deal and the new", Beard, Charles A., Smith, George H. MacMillian, 1940, p29
[2] "The old deal and the new", Beard, Charles A., Smith, George H. MacMillian, 1940, p36
[3] President's research committee on social trends: "Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1933, Table 6, p.281
[4] National resources committee:"The structure of the American economy", 1939, p.107
[5] Standard Statistics, Co publications for this period
[6] National resources committee:"The structure of the American economy", 1939, p.371 Table III
[7] https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBSummaryRpt.asp?BegYear=1934&EndYear=2017&State=1&Header=0
[8] https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/frbslreview/rev_stls_196103.pdf 
[9] https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf 
[18] https://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/072915/how-petrodollars-affect-us-dollar.asp 
[19] https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2001/20010125/ 
[20] https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/reports/01-07-outlook.pdf 
[21] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CIVPART